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The Causes of the Great War 



By 
EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER 

University of Michigan 



Reprinted from The American Political Science Revieiv, 
Vol. IX, No. I, February, IQI5 



Keprinted from The American Political Sctenck Review, Vol. IX, No. 1, February, 1915 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER 

University of Michigan 

In 1806 Prussia engaged in war with Napoleon. The swiftest 
of his triumphs followed. In two months the Prussians had 
surrendered their fortresses, and seen annihilated the greatness 
which Europe had failed to crush in the time of Frederick the 
Great. A -period of humiliation followed, and for some years 
the people lived under the conqueror's yoke. 

Deliverance came when Napoleon, stretching too far his power, 
and arousing the spirit of peoples, was defeated by Europe in 
arms. The liberation which alone Prussia could not have ac- 
complished, was yet wrought partly by herself, for deliverance 
was preceded by regeneration in which her military system 
was fundamentally reformed. But it may be that what re- 
mained after all as the principal heritage from these years was 
the abiding sense that Prussia had suffered from being weak, and 
that only through military strength could there be safety in 
the future. 

The expansion and greatness of Prussia left unfulfilled the old 
idea of a united Gennany. Through the middle ages and down 
to this time Gennany had remained disunited, and weak and 
despised because of it. The smallest states had now disappeared, 
but still there were larger ones, grouped under Austria in vague 
and shadowy em.pire. And the history of Germany in the half 
century which followed the downfall of Napoleon is a record of 
yearning and striving on the part of people filled with distant 
memories, and noble aspiration after that strength and union 
which had come to their neighbors and yet been denied to them- 
selves. 

Gradually it was seen that Austria would not or could not do 
the work, and presently that Prussia (;ould do it. What fol- 

IG 

wmtsmf 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 17 

lowed has often been told: Denmark was despoiled, Austria 
defeated, and then a great confederation formed, and finally 
the old enemy France struck down, her eastern provinces rent 
away, and in the midst of mighty fervor a real German Empire 
founded. So splendid was this work of Bismarck that had his 
methods been different he might have stood as the greatest man 
of his century. 

This era is important not only for what it ended and began, 
but also for the methods used in it. Bismarck was not worse 
than most of the diplomats who preceded or followed him, but 
the immensity of his achievement and the splendor of his suc- 
cess have cast into bold relief the evil and the good that was 
in him. Frequently his instruments were cunning, force, and 
fraud. With him means were justified by end. A great task 
was to be achieved, as he could, so long as it was achieved. Ordi- 
nary justice and moral considerations had with him, as with 
Napoleon, small place. There was pity for the weak and mercy 
to the fallen only as such things were politic. He left behind 
him a wondrous glamour, but he left also fear and hatred and 
desire for revenge. And as by force and violence he had accom- 
plished what he had done, so he knew that only by force could 
his work be maintained. 

Bismarck had isolated his enemies and then struck them down. 
From Austria he had taken little, and so he was able to create 
friendship based on identity of interests, but from France he 
had taken much, and France must remain lonely and weak, 
powerless to take vengeance and undo what Gemaans had 
achieved. In this he was largely successful. Before France 
had recovered from her wounds, Austria, Germany and Russia 
had drawn together. Italy was poor, and with her own unity 
just obtained; England remained as before in splendid isolation. 

In France the years after 1871 are the saddest since the Hun- 
dred Years War, but they are at the same time of imperishable 
glory. The eastern frontier was now so near to Paris as to make 
it seem indefensible. Crushed by an enormous indemnity and 
also by the sense of irreparable disaster, it seemed that France 
had fallen on days too evil for cure. But with immortal spirit 



18 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

her people at once began the task of regeneration. In a few 
years the frontier was re-fortified, and the new mihtary system 
copied from the enemy made her seem more formidable than 
ever; though this strength was somewhat counterbalanced by 
the weakness inseparable from the beginnings of democratic 
government. 

So strong did France become and so surprising was her re- 
covery that Germany became alarmed, and seriously considered 
striking her down before preparations had gone further, and so 
completely that she could never be dangerous again. This was 
not done, but France remained filled with burning desire for re- 
venge and hope of winning back some day the provinces which 
she had lost. It seemed, however, that the opportunity was 
destined never to come. At first she was not merely weak but 
alone. Afterwards when the balance of power had been re- 
dressed a different spirit had come at the same time that changes 
of birth-rate had produced such disparity of numbers as to make 
an attack by France upon Gennany unthinkable. 

The appearance of the Geniian Empire was a rude disturb- 
ance of the old political equilibrium in Europe. Bismarck 
sought readjustment by a new grouping of nations about Ger- 
many. Austria, who soon came to be dependent upon German 
support, was firmly attached in alliance. To these two powers 
Russia had been drawn for a while, but it was soon apparent 
that the question of the Balkans made the interests of Germany's 
partners irreconcilable. During the Russo-Turkish War she was 
forced to choose which of her friends she would in the future have, 
and the support which she gave to Austria made it certain that 
Russia would soon seek her interests elsewhere. 

Gradually in eastern Europe developed a situation like that 
to the west of the Rhine. On the one side was Russia smart- 
ing under indignity from the Teutonic powers; on the other 
France alone and unrevenged. Memory of old antagonisms 
kept these two powers apart, but in time common interest proved 
stronger, and after 1891 the world knew that there was a Dual 
Alliance. Meanwhile the astute Bismarck seized upon old sus- 
picion and colonial rivalry, played upon Italy's fear of France, 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 19 

and brought her into a Triple AlUance with Austria and the 
German Empire. Down to the end of the century and appar- 
ently for a few years after, the peace of Europe was maintained, 
as men believed, by the two armed cam.ps of the Dual Alliance 
and the Triple Alliance, constantly increasing their armaments 
and debts, and keeping against each other vigilant watch and 
ward. On the outskirts of Europe remained England, safe, as 
it seemed, and aloof. 

The first decade of the new century saw immense alteration. 
Friendships cooled, enemies became friends, and newcomers 
entered the opposing camps. Of this there were many causes, 
but most of them may be traced ultimately to the prodigious 
growth of the Gennan Empire, which is the most striking phenom- 
enon of Europe in recent times. 

A nation which was mainly agricultural in 1870 had by 1910 
come to be second only to the United States in manufactures 
and second only to England in shipping. So fast had national 
riches increased that it was now the wealthiest nation in Europe, 
having in tw^o generations outstripped both England and France. 
It was filled with exuberant strength and aggressive energy. 
The basis of this was method and organization and efficiency, 
but it was also the increasing population of the empire. In all 
the changes of this time no single factor was more important. 

In 1801 the population of Great Britain was 10,500,000, that 
of France 27,000,000; in 1911 they had respectively 45,000,000 
and barely 40,000,000. In 1816 the territories of the present 
German Empire contained 24,000,000, but in 1911 this had risen 
to 66,000,000. In England population had increased rapidly; 
in France for a long time it had remained stationarj^; in Germany 
it had grown amazingly, and was now enlarging by a milUon 
souls a year. During the later centuries of the Roman Empire, 
and all over the world among civilized peoples in the nineteenth 
century, birth-rate had shown a tendency to fall as material com- 
fort and standard of hving were raised. It was the case in the 
Scandinavian countries, and to some extent in England and 
the United States; but in France, where conditions tended to- 
ward widest diffusion of proprietorship and wealth, this con- 



20 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

dition had become universal, and after the loss of Alsace and 
Lorraine, France was left with a smaller population than before. 
On the other hand there were such countries as Italy and Russia, 
with relatively low standard of living, and fecundity excessively 
great; but there was also Germany with expanding industry 
and increasing wealth, where the birth-rate was tremendously 
high, and for a long time showed scant prospect of diminution. 
Thus it was that German statisticians could gloat over their 
old enemy, and look forward to the day when there would be in 
Germany twice as many people as in France, and as many as in • 
England and France together. 

Here was an old problem which had loomed up in bygone 
times and been lost in the changes of the past: whether a na- 
tion which increases rapidly the number of its people in lands 
already well filled, does so because of strength and joyous youth, 
vigor and creative power, and so strides onward to happiness 
and higher achievement, or whether it represents a lower civili- 
zation which in the past has brought strife and destruction; and 
whether a nation which increases little or merely maintains its 
numbers, even though it maintains them in intelligence and 
material happiness, is a tired nation with halting step upon the 
way of degeneracy and death, or whether it has attained a higher 
civilization to which the world will advance in the future. 

But Germany, like a giant conscious of greatness waxed ever 
more ambitious and aggressive, and the pressure of numbers, 
first felt within her own bounds, was soon felt by all her neigh- 
bors, and at last by every nation in the world. For where intel- 
ligence and efficiency are nearly equal, numbers will usually be 
decisive. It was the greatness of her population which so long 
gave to France the leadership of Europe; and now behind ad- 
mirable organization and thoroughness of method, it was increase 
of people which gave the German Empire impregnable position 
across the continent, and let its rulers dream of the hegemony 
of the world. 

In France, w'here terrible memories lingered, the sense of 
inferiority became stronger and stronger. The rapid progress 
of the antagonist made impossible putting in the field so many 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 



21 



fighting men that there could be an attack upon Germany, and 
the utmost that patriotic Frenchmen could hope for in another 
day of wrath was the saving of their country by defensive war- 
fare. Sometimes even this seemed hopeless without assistance. 
Accordingly, when Russia turned aside from Europe to seek 
adventure in Manchuria, and when her strength, though not 
destroyed, for a time disappeared in the west, France perceiving 
that the balance of power was altered again, sought the friend- 
ship of England, and England was glad now to give it. 

The relations of England and Germany attracted Uttle atten- 
tion until the beginning of the twentieth century, when the 
wonderful progress of Germany, the industrial competition which 
resulted, and the immense power which she was gaining, caused 
increasing disquietude among British leaders. At this time, 
also, hostility during the Boer War became more ominous when 
Germany, avowing that her future lay upon the sea, began a 
naval program greater than any nation had ever undertaken. 
The construction of warships was carried swiftly forward, and 
for a time seemed to threaten British superiority on the sea, 
and, as many thought, the existence of their empire. Thus was 
brought about a situation fraught with peril for the future. 
England came to believe that she must seek powerful friends 
to stand with her, and so began making friendships and settling 
old disputes. Germany hastened and increased her efforts. Sus- 
picion and recrimination followed, and the probabiUty of con- 
flict was openly discussed. Therefore, England having entered 
into friendly relations with Italy and America, sought the friend- 
ship of France, and became presently less suspicious of Russia. 
Then a mighty change became apparent: England who had so 
long stood apart, finding her interests outside of European 
entanglements was presently the center and indeed the inspira- 
tion of a vast combination opposed to Germany. The avowed 
object was defence; but Germans refused to believe that this 
coalition did not threaten their safety, and they saw in the 
activity of England a monstrous attempt to isolate their empire, 
surround it with enemies, and deprive it of chance to expand and 
seek out its "place in the sun." 



22 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

In 1904 an agreenaent ended all disputes between England 
and France, each nation making promises and concessions. This 
Entente Cordiale was possible because memories of bitterness 
were dying out ; but it was owing principally to the dread which 
both nations had of the Germans, And a change as significant 
soon followed in the relations between England and Russia. 
The fact that Russia, defeated in Asia, now seemed less menacing 
there, and that she was the ally of friendly France, combined 
with growing fear of German plans to secure an understanding 
between Petrograd and London. Hence, in the first ten years 
of the century there came to be not only the alUance between 
Russia and France, but also the friendly understanding between 
France and England, and then the understanding between Russia 
and England. And as interest and ambition made this three- 
fold connection stronger, the whole group was referred to as the 
Triple Entente, and by 1912 represented the armed camp con- 
fronting the Triple Alhance. 

The recent history of Europe is the history of the opposition 
of these two groups. The purpose of each was to maintain the 
existing situation, though probably on both sides there were 
leaders who aimed at the master\" of Europe. In resources and 
in actual power the opponents were not unevenly matched. In 
territory", in number of men, and in financial resources, the powers 
of the Entente were indisputably superior; but with the Triple 
Alhance there were advantages of cohesiveness, organization, 
and position which seemed to redress the balance; while the 
tradition of German mihtary supremacy still held powerful 
sway. 

England had immense resources in money, and she held within 
her empire a fourth of the territory and a fourth of the population 
of the world. But the bonds which united the parts were loosely 
drawn. The problem of framing some scheme of federation to 
present a strong and united front to enemies seemed hopeless 
to most Enghshmen, while enemies beheved that the first touch 
of disaster would see the empire crumble into fragments. And 
if it were doubtful whether the outh^ng parts could give effective 
assistance, it was certain that England herself, lacking as she 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT "WAR 23 

did a huge anny like those possessed by her neighbors, would 
in case of a sudden blow be nearly impotent upon land. She 
must have the great wars fought upon the continent. She must 
support France against Geniiany, as once she had supported her 
against Spain, and later had supported Germany against France. 
Ultunately her salvation must he in master}^ of the sea. Here 
German competition was felt more severely each year, but as 
England had become alarmed in time and made prodigious ef- 
forts, her predominance was still unquestioned. 

The strength of Russia was uncertain. So far did she lie across 
the world, and so vast was the nunaber of her men, that there 
was in her bulk and immensity something horrible. About the 
end of the nineteenth century the ]Musco\ite milhons seemed a 
menace to the remainder of the world. But this legend had 
been shattered by the events of the Russo-Japanese War, which 
revealed inferior mihtar^' and naval organization, corruption 
and incapacity in the government, and ignorance and discon- 
tent among the masses. After 1905 Russia was for some time 
of httle weight in Europe. She was, indeed, recovering, but her 
enemies boasted that when she had recovered, she would be 
unwieldly and incapable as she had been in the far east. 

In many respects France was more feared than England or 
Russia. From the awful disasters of 1870 she had recovered 
completely. In respect of ready monej' France was now the 
nation best prepared to fight. The frontier had been fortified 
impregnably, and the ardor of Frenchmen had built up an army 
which might be inferior to the German, but which the Germans 
themselves held in high respect. France they beheved their 
enemy most dangerous and inmiediate, and the plans of their 
general staff always contemplated the first stroke to the west, 
and the crushing of France before her allies could render assist- 
ance. It was always doubtful whether France could hold her 
own: it was not certain that the temperament and genius of 
the people permitted the painstaking organization which the 
example of Germany made necessary, nor was it probable that a 
repubhcan government allowed of the rapid disposition and iron 
control which must be expected in Berhn ; while stationary popu- 



24 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

lation face to face with enormous increase in Germany made a 
conflict more hopeless eveiy year. "I hold France in the hol- 
low of my hand," the emperor is said once to have declared. 

There were, then, in this group France powerful and efficient, 
but smaller and weaker than Gennany; Russia vast and in- 
calculable, but of doubtful quality; England wealthy and all- 
powerful at sea, but untried in a war of anned nations. In a 
great conflict, moreover, these peoples must operate upon exterior 
lines, while it was not certain that all of them would act together. 
Always the bond of their union was thought of German aggression. 

In the camp of the Triple Alliance there were elements of 
weakness still more pronounced. Fomially the union was 
stronger than that of their rivals, but actually this was known 
not to be so; for the power of one of the partners was doubtful, 
and the action of another uncertain. 

As to the strength of Germany there was never any doubt. 
Those who passed down the Rhine or went to Berlin saw every- 
w^here colossal power. In the rising cities, the mounting num- 
bers, and the vast material creations of this country there was a 
sheer vitality which one saw not so much in England and little 
in France. And in Germany the very purpose of the civiliza- 
tion seemed different. The army was the most powerful in the 
world; nowhere did numbers and equipment go so far to make 
a nation invincible; and no army could be so quickly assembled 
and hurled upon its enemy with such awful speed and precision. 
The navy, a newer creation, had grown monstrously and was 
now feared by every nation nearby. As an inheritance from the 
great war German soldiers believed that their army was uncon- 
querable. Finally, the power of a great and intelligent people 
was wielded by a government autocratic in spirit, in character 
capable and efficient. 

The closest alliance in Europe was that which bound Gennany 
and Austria-Hungary. Whatever happened, it was nearly cer- 
tain that Austria could count upon Germany, and in turn would 
follow her lead. But probably the aUiance was stronger than the 
ally. About the Dual Monarchy there was something so arti- 
ficial and conglomerate that apparently it was held together by 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 25 

pressure from without, though some found the chief bond in the 
person of its aged ruler, after whose death the fragments must 
fall asunder. It was an unwieldy mass of many races and creeds. 
The peoples had never been fused into one nation, but lived under 
a government medieval and reactionary in spirit, which con- 
trolled by keeping them apart. The strength of the government 
resulted from an agreement by which a German minority in 
the north and a Hungarian minority in the south held in sub- 
jection all others; but even between these two quarrels were 
violent and bitter. In the Hapsburg monarchy was little of 
the strength which comes from the spirit and enthusiasm of na- 
tional feeling, while in military and material things it was lack- 
ing and effete. 

As to Italy, her progress had been one of the most hopeful signs 
in the recent development of Europe. Among the people much 
misery existed, and undoubtedly the country was poor, but 
population was increasing rapidly, and along with it prosperity 
and wealth. An anny and a navy had been built up beyond 
the resources of the people, but they made Italy a strong ally and 
important in high politics. She might, then, be of much assist- 
ance to the powers of central Europe, but it gradually came to 
be seen that she was an unwilling member of the alliance. Into 
this alliance she had come through fear and anger at France, 
but the causes of fear had long been removed, and of France 
she was now a good friend. On the other hand, Austria, the 
old enemy and oppressor, still held unwilling Italians within 
her domain, while in the Balkans and in the Adriatic the rivalry 
of Austria and Italy became steadily more intense. In 1911 
Italy attacked possessions of Turkey, the friend of the Germanic 
powers, and when as a result of the war she was left with spoil 
of Tripoli, the rift between herself and her alUes widened, since 
her new province could be held no longer than she remained at 
peace with the Triple Entente. Though it might be good policy 
not to withdraw from the Triple AUiance in ordinary times, 
it was not certain that Italy could be brought to fight against 
France, and doubtful whether she would not one day give Aus- 
tria defiance. 



26 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

Thus it may be seen that the union of some of the partners 
was uncertain. Austria and Germany acted as one, but Italy 
stood with them as a result of conditions which no longer pre- 
vailed. In the opposing camp England and France were now 
true friends, and would most probably support each other, while 
Russia and France were bound by definite alliance and perhaps 
by common interest, but between Russia and England there were 
differences which had long obtained and were now suppressed 
only because of common fears. The ties, then, which bound 
some of the nations were artificial and repugnant, and might 
well dissolve as conditions changed; but there were also forces 
of such antipathy and such inmieasurable depth that they could 
not easily be disposed of, and would hardly be removed without 
conflict. They were Pan-Germanism against Pan-Slavism, and 
the rivalry of Germany and England. 

The ideas which underhe the first of these forces are so vast, 
indefinite, and comprehensive that it is difficult to understand 
and define them, nor is it certain that even their champions have 
reduced them to clearness and precision. By Pan-Slavism 
may be understood the idea of uniting in one great power all the 
Slavic peoples, who together would seek out their destiny; but 
less directly it means the increase of Russia and her expansion 
toward Constantinople and the Adriatic, and lordship over the 
races of the earth. Pan-Germanism is a vaguer thing. In the 
beginning it meant the union of all Germans in Europe, and 
perhaps of the Germans scattered in lands beyond, but in later 
years it has come in some sense to mean the rising ambition of 
Germany and Austria to obtain the mastery of the sea and the 
hegemony of Europe, and by building up a great empire from the 
Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, win for themselves the mastery 
of the world. Between these two ideals there might be truce, 
but there never could be compromise, for the reaUzation of the 
one meant always the destruction of the other. Success would 
probably come to whichever power controlled the Balkan penin- 
sula. When Russian battalions guarded the Bosporus and 
Aegean waters, then at last would Russia have her window upon 
the world; but on that day at Constantinople would Russia 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 27 

control all Danube trade, her finger would be upon the artery 
of Austria, and on that day must come to an end the dream of 
the Gemaanic powers to stretch their domim'on down to Babylon. 
And, on the other hand, if ever Germany through Austria won 
the Bosporus and the Hellespont, then would Russia, thrust back 
upon the north and south and east, lie like a giant bound among its 
enemies, a vast but an interior and a secondary power. In the 
Balkans, therefore, was the danger-spot of Europe. The destinies 
of polite and wealthy nations were here in the keeping of plotters 
and peasants and mountaineers. 

More imminent, as some believed, though less necessary, was 
conflict between Gemaany and England. There was a group 
of Prussian historians who taught that the interests of the two 
were irreconcilable. In the past Germany had given herself 
over to religion, philosophy and idealism which became the com- 
mon heritage of mankind, while England, sheltered by ocean 
and favored by currents and wind, had stood like a robber baron 
by the road of the conamerce of the world, and from the toll which 
she levied there had grown wealthy and great. When her neigh- 
bors fought, she stood craftily aside, pitting one against the 
other, and winning greatest profit in the end. By chance, by 
accident, by the favor of the gods, not by merit, England now 
held a vast empire and commerce; but this empire was decrepit 
and rotten with prosperity and decay. Now at last when the 
German people had forged their unity and strength into a mighty 
weapon and begun their quest for the greater empire which their 
greatness predestined, everywhere the world was preempted, 
everywhere it was portioned among English people or their allies, 
while England held at her mercy the trade of Germany as once she 
had held the commerce of Holland; and whenever Germans 
sought to expand and win their way, always England plotted 
and thwarted and held them back. Evil as this was, it was in- 
tolerable that a vigorous, youthful nation should suffer so at the 
hands of one aged and tired. But there would come a day when 
the Gennan fleet, mightier every year, could strike with fatal 
effect, when German battalions could m.arch into London, and 
divide up a wondrous spoil. Then would the future of Germany 



28 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

begin, for then she would hold the mastery of Europe, the com- 
merce of the world, and the islands of the sea which had been 
England's. Even the Muscovite might then be bought off, or 
thrust aside into India, or given Constantinople, so that Ger- 
many and Russia between them might rule the world. 

It is not impossible that the ruling caste, efficient yet reaction- 
ary, confronted by the rising tide of democracy strong in Ger- 
many but politically more fettered than in other free countries of 
the west, that this ruling caste sought to postpone the decline of 
its system by entrancing the people with projects of imperial 
splendor and world dominion, which by the logic of fate must 
be at the expense of Great Britain's empire. How many of 
the German people believed these things one may not say, per- 
haps an increasing number; but certainly there were Germans 
who proclaimed them, and in England produced uneasiness, 
alarm, and then panic. Men remembered how Denmark and 
Austria had been struck down and France lured to her ruin, and 
bethought them how in darkening days of the past their ances- 
tors had fought against Philip and Louis the Grand. Was their 
heritage now at stake in new peril? Therefore England's jeal- 
ousy and envy were all tinged with fear. Expansion, the win- 
ning of colonies, creating a great fleet, to Germany seemed 
glorious and proper ambition and mere doing what England had 
once done herself, but in all such efforts England saw threat 
and aggression. So British warships were multiplied, and 
ceaselessly from Whitehall a net was woven about Germany 
to hold her back and bind her in. 

For nine years the powers who divided the greatness of Europe 
faced each other in armed and portentous peace. Four times was 
the flood near to bursting its wall. In 1905, France with the 
sanction of England made ready to acquire Morocco, but Ger- 
many, defying both antagonists, forced the abandonment of this 
design. Three years after, Austria, violating the Treaty of Ber- 
lin, incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina within her dominion, 
when the wrath of Russia was quenched by the warlike demeanor 
of Germany, who appeared beside her ally in "shining armor." 
Both of these triumphs were secured before Russia had recovered 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 29 

from her defeat by Japan. But as the balance of power was once 
more restored, the opposing group was more resolute. In 1911 
France entered again upon her quest in Morocco. In the crisis 
which followed Europe was brought to the verge of war, but in the 
end Germany yielded, Morocco fell to France, and the Entente se- 
cured a great triumph. Next year the Balkan War made a 
situation equally grave. The army of Austria was mobilized, 
and a vast body of Russians gathered behind the girdle of Polish 
fortresses. But once more the statesmen of Europe averted the 
great war, and this crisis like the others passed away. 

The outcome of the Balkan War made it nearly certain that 
this could not be done again, for the results of the war involved 
a change in the great game which the rival powers were playing. 
Down to 1913 Germany and Austria had gained advantages 
in the Balkans and reduced the prestige of Russia. Rumania 
was almost an appendage of the Triple Alliance, Turkey was 
coming to be considered so, and the other countries were weak, 
hemmed in by hostile neighbors, or distracted with local quarrels. 
It might seem that while Germany held Russia in check, Austria 
would march in triumph to Salonika. But the events of 1912 
and 1913 produced a revolution. Servia, Montenegro, Bul- 
garia, and Greece, combining suddenly, fell upon Turkey and 
overwhelmed her in rapid and decisive campaigns, and when 
Austria, appalled by the sudden turn of events would have inter- 
vened to stay their progress, the opposition of Russia prevented 
her taking any action. The final result was the appearance of 
a group of powerful Balkan States who looked rather to Russia 
than central Europe. 

The immediate consequences were far-reaching and profound. 
The Triple Alliance now became weaker at the same time that it 
was called upon to face more numerous enemies. Through the 
efforts of Austria an independent Adriatic state, Albania, had 
been constituted from the relics of the Turkish domain. Here 
Italy and Austria began striving for predominance with increas- 
ing ill-will and suspicion. Austria, long bounded on the south 
by friendly Rumania, indifferent Bulgaria, and by Servia hos- 
tile but helpless, now found these nations so much stronger and 



30 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

SO little friendly that she must thereafter keep no small part of 
her military forces to guard her frontier against them. This 
meant that she could now marshal fewer soldiers against Russia, 
and it meant that Austria and Germany were relatively weaker 
than before. 

Now this alteration occurred at a time when the star of the 
Triple Alliance was no longer ascendant as it had been after 1904. 
The fact that Germany had suffered disaster in the controversy 
over Morocco was certain indication that England and France 
had gained much confidence and strength, while Russia, for- 
getting her evil fortune in the east, had applied herself so dili- 
gently to the task of recuperation, that it was no longer possible 
to neglect her or put her to shame. 

There was much alarm in Germany in 1913. The shadow 
of Russia seemed cast across the empire, and fear and darkness 
prevailed in many quarters. The old revenge of France might 
be more dreaded now, and one cartoon showed Delcasse riding 
the Russian elephant toward Berlin. So, the German authori- 
ties who had long used the enmity of England to forward naval 
expansion, played now upon fear of Russia and obtained a huge 
increase of the arniy, raising it to 800,000 men. This they 
asserted was a purely defensive thing, designed to redress the 
balance upset by events in the Balkans; but to France it seemed 
ominous of coming attack, and she made a last effort to offset 
the preponderance of her neighbor. By extending military serv- 
ice from two to three years, she did obtain a considerable in- 
crease in her army of the first line, but it was realized that this 
was literally the last card which she could play in the gamble 
of fortune. At the same time Russia made great enlargement 
of her standing army, and throughout Europe naval expansion 
went on apace. 

Melancholy days had come. The great nations, assembled 
in two groups, confronted each other always expecting war and 
always armed for the fray. In their train the smaller ones were 
gathering. Vast armaments, involving, as they did, perpetual 
anxiety and heavy taxation, might for a long while maintain 
equilibrium, but one day they would probably lead to conflict. 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 31 

So great was the burden that some even hoped for the speedy- 
coming of war to remove what could no longer be borne. But 
the most peaceful dared not disarm for fear of annihilation. 
At the beginning of 1914 probably some knew that the storm so 
much dreaded and so long postponed was about to burst at last. 

The events which led immediately to the catastrophe of the 
summer are only known in part, nor can they be learned com- 
pletely until some generations have passed; but certain elements 
of the situation and certain fundamental factors are understood 
now, perhaps, as well as they can be when the archives have 
yielded up their secrets. 

Certainly there was the rivalry of Germany and England, 
resulting from the power and ambition of Germany, and the 
dread and jealousy of England. In Germany there was irrita- 
tion at the unceasing hostility of France, and a growing desire 
to crush her since her friendship could not be obtained. In 
France the memories of the great war had left undying hatred, 
the statues of the lost provinces remained draped in mourning, 
and there lingered the dream of revenge and the redemption of 
Alsace and Lorraine. In eastern Europe a mightier conflict was 
looming up between Teuton and Slav, a conflict growing in the 
lap of fate. And finally, the nations whose increase was rapid 
were allied with time which would surely hereafter give them 
victory. It was to the interest of France and England to strike 
before there were more Gennan millions. It was Germany's 
interest to wait, except that Russia growing still more rapidly 
made it fatal for her to delay. 

A peculiar cause is thought by some to have been the changing 
character of the German people. It is probably true that Ger- 
many had been altered by too great success. The unparalleled 
triumphs of the Franco-Prussian War had given German leaders 
supreme confidence, and to the soldiers belief that they were in- 
vincible. This feeling, which might have become nobility and 
firmness, tended to appear as haughty arrogance, because of the 
completeness with which it possessed men's minds, and because 
of a materialism based upon immense material prosperity. Kind- 
liness and homely virtue might still be the character of many 



32 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 

Germans, but this was thought to be less evident than half a 
century before. The ruling caste and hosts of followers now 
worshipped might and force and power. According to hostile 
foreigners, the teaching of Nietzsche that Christian morality was 
the base and servile relic of olden times so far prevailed that by 
Germans Christianity was being discarded. Old, pernicious 
doctrines that might was right, and the end makes good the 
means, reappeared in new and dangerous guise. In other na- 
tions arose distrust and appalling fear that Germany would 
strike without pity and without remorse, and exact to the very 
■ uttermost, while in Germany such boasts were loud and frequent. 
All this was best expressed in the writings of Bernhardi, well 
known now, but more dreadful when they first appeared: that 
war was necessary and ennobling, that no consideration out- 
weighed necessity, that France must be struck down so that 
never again could she be an opponent, that the reckoning with 
England must follow, and that superior German culture must 
be spread by the sword. 

But much that her enemies regarded as arrogance and aggres- 
sion was always the expansion and increase and prosperity of 
Germany, and she saw in their fear of her and combining against 
her only bitter and dangerous envy. England seemed the greedy 
opponent, lying across her way and thwarting expansion ; France 
a neighbor whose friendship had often been sought, who persisted 
in sullen wrath; Russia a power inferior and reactionary, but 
huge and perpetually a menace. To German people, wedged 
in between these foes, military perfection did not seem essentially 
militaristic, but the sole shield with which they w^arded off ruin 
and death. And to many the aggressive spirit, acknowledged 
to exist, was only that spirit which had once given their rivals 
a glory and a success which the past had denied to themselves. 
' The torch was kindled in the Balkans. Austria desired to re- 
cover what was lost in 1913. Servia stronger and more am- 
bitious now yearned to possess Servian provinces which Austria 
had annexed in 1908. In Bosnia and Herzegovina was begun a 
propaganda, supported probably by Servian authorities, irritat- 
ing to Austria and dangerous, and which culminated in June 



THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT WAR 33 

in the murder of Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne. 
Austria, to avenjje this crime, hoping, perhaps, to crush her inso- 
lent httle neighbor, and apparently seeing an opportunity to 
regain the leadership of the Balkan peninsula, launched at Servia 
an ultimatum which no independent state could entertain. The 
terms of this ultimatum and the scant time allowed for an answer 
made it evident that Austria expected no compromise. The 
Servians appealed to Russia. If their country made entire sur- 
render, or if Russia failed to respond, then Slav predominance 
in the Balkans would be only a memory of the past. 

Russia gave support, and Austria and Russia began to mobihze. 
There was small chance that Austria could withstand the onset, 
or that Germany would permit her to be crushed alone. But 
because of the alliances which existed, if Germany entered the 
lists, then France m.ust enter also, and the general conflagration 
would begin. Though we may not know certainly, it seems 
that France and England desired peace, and m.ade efforts to 
secure it. The hopes of Europe, therefore, lay in the possibility 
that Germany might restrain her ally, and that Austria, though 
exacting from. Servia satisfaction, might allay the apprehensions 
of Russia. 

And now millions of humble people and travellers scatteied 
across the conthient became aware of the cloud which rose like 
a hurricane. Difficulties appeared in the way of peace. The 
ominous hush was broken l)y the march of troops and the rattle 
of arms. "The angel of death is al^road. We may almost hear 
the beating of his wings." 

Upon whom, the blame directly rests nuist long remain matter 
of opinion. Austria abated her dem.ands too late. Germ.any 
arming apace required that Russian mobilization cease. France 
receiving peremptory question what she would do, replied that 
she would act as became the interests of France. In the early 
days of August there was war between Austria and Servia, and 
between Germ.any and France and Russia. Italy finding her 
interest not with her allies declared that the term.s of the alliance 
allowed her in the present situation to remain neutral. 

The position of England was peculiar. In such a war her in- 



34 THE AMERTCAX POLITICAL SCIEXCE REVIEW 

terests were bound up with those of Fi'nnce. with whom she had 
entered into such agreements that all the Fi'eneh na^y was in 
the Mediterranean, wliile her own ships were in the North Sea. 
As a point of honor she could not allow France to be attacked 
by sea in the north. Moreover, if France were crushed, not 
only would England have lost her first line of defense, but if the 
\sTitings of Pan-Gennanists might be believed, all the coast from 
Antwerp to Boulogne would be seized, and Germany could then 
wait at her leisiu-e for "the day." If war between England and 
Genn.any were ine\"itable, as many believed, then it was far 
better to fight now along with Russia and France, than without 
friends contend with a mightier Gennany of the future. But 
a strong party asserted that conflict could be avoided in the 
ftitm-e. and that to fight in this war meant strengthening Russia, 
a crhue against Gennany and ci\'ilization. 

Gennany herself decided the issue. The frontier of France 
frt>m Belfort to "\'erdun was well-nigh impregnable. The general 
staff believed that a war against France and Russia nuist be 
fought by the swift crusliing of France and the turning against 
Russia with full force, and it was suspected that Gennan annies 
might in case of need marcli straight through Belgimn upon 
Paris. Belgimn desired above all things to remain out of the 
strife, but it was her misfortmie to lie in the way. Certainly 
the neutrality of the comitrj* had been guaranteed by a treaty 
to wliich Prussia had been signatoiy, but as the chancellor said, 
nece^ity knows no law. and the man who hews his way must 
not think of the wrong he does. The beginning of hostilities 
s;\w the violation of Luxembiu-g and Belgimn. Then A\ere 
awakened all those apprehensions wliich had existed in England 
fron\ the tune of Elizabeth to the younger Pitt, and a few days 
niore found England with Belgimn in the circle of Gennany's foes. 

It has been thought that this sununer was chosen to precipi- 
tate the confiiet because of the supposed weakness of the Triple 
Entente. France was distracted by scandal and confession of 
military weakness: Russia by industrial unrest: and England by 
the contR^versy over Home Rule. It might well have seemed in 



THE CAUSES OF THE (UtKAT WAR OO 

Berlin that the iiunuent wa?^ at hand to strike for woi'ld dominion 
— or downfalL 

But however this be, it may be seen that tlie causes which led 
to the cataclysm had long been in operation. They n\ust he 
sought in the curse of militarism, the spoliation and resentment 
of France, the envy and apprehension of England, the arrogance 
and prosperity of Germany, the weakness of Austria, the rise 
of the Balkan states, and the glowering menace of Russia. 

The blood and the tears and the ruin of Europe bring little of 
hope as yet. Russia all-powerful and reactionary? Germany 
over Europe, omnipotent in arms? l^urope exhausted and 
spent? Perhajis in some wondrous way gooil will be wrought 
from the wreck, but this we do not yet see. ^Nlan who knows 
little of the ])resent knows not the future, and nmst watch in 
dumb expectation the loom of the universe rush on. 



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